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Abstract: The discussion on the implications of Scandinavian Legal Realism would benefit con-
siderably from more careful historical attention to the different political and philosophical ambi-
tions of the theoreticians that followed Axel Hägerström. The scholars, who were later gathered 
under the label Scandinavian Legal Realism, did not represent a static theoretical position that 
remained unchanged from the 1910s to the 1950s; rather, their aims and ambitions varied with 
changing political and philosophical circumstances. The purpose of this article is to propose a 
distinction between two generations of Scandinavian Legal Realists. While the goal of the first 
generation (Vilhelm Lundstedt and Karl Olivecrona) fell little short of revolutionising the field of 
jurisprudence, transforming law into a vehicle for political and social reform, one of the main 
objectives of the second generation (Alf Ross and Ingemar Hedenius) was to take the edge off 
the radicalism of their predecessors. 
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If Scandinavian Legal Realism could be reduced to one basic tenet, the idea that the 
law is a social phenomenon ultimately relying only on the sanction of man himself 
would be one prominent candidate. This was a basic line of thought for the founder 
of the school, Axel Hägerström (1868-1939), as well as for his followers Vilhelm 
Lundstedt (1882-1955), Karl Olivecrona (1897-1980), Alf Ross (1899-1979) and 
Ingemar Hedenius (1908-1982). The assertion that the law is man-made and thus 
revisable was a useful philosophy for intellectuals with radical ambitions as it 
enabled them to claim that the law must not (or indeed cannot) be used as a conser-
vative argument against political reform. But the nature of the connection between 
Scandinavian Legal Realism and politics has been a regular topic for discussion 
among legal theorists and intellectual historians in recent years. Roughly, the com-
batants can be divided into two opposing camps. On one hand, it is quite common 
to suggest that Hägerström and his disciples are to blame for state-absolutistic, 
paternalistic and even totalitarian tendencies in Sweden (Bjarup 1982, 195 f.; 2004; 
2005, 12; Sundberg 1978, 191 f.; 1984). On the other hand, there are a number of 
scholars who see connections to the democratisation of the Nordic societies, and 
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interpret Scandinavian Legal Realism as a legal philosophy of the liberal welfare 
state (Alexander 2002; Blandhol 1999; Malminen 2007; Pihlajamäki 1997).1  
 There is more to this debate than diverging attitudes towards the political deve-
lopment in the Nordic countries since the 1930s, but the discussion would benefit 
considerably from more careful attention to the ambitions of the individual histori-
cal actors. The scholars that were later gathered under the label Scandinavian Legal 
Realists did not represent a static theoretical position whose ideas remained unchan-
ged from the 1910s to the 1950s; rather, the aims of the different legal realists va-
ried with changing political and philosophical circumstances. The purpose of this 
article is to propose a distinction between two factions, or generations, of Hä-
gerströmian scholars that were occupied with different political as well as theoretical 
questions and ideas. By distinguishing between Lundstedt and Olivecrona on one 
hand, and Hedenius and Ross on the other, we might be able to understand not 
only the apparently contradicting views on the relation between Scandinavian Legal 
Realism and politics, but also the late international acknowledgement of the move-
ment, and in particular the rather late reception in the neighbouring countries of 
Finland and Norway.  
 By employing the concept “generation”, however, it is not suggested that the 
thoughts and ideas of the historical actors are determined by the year that they were 
born (Olivecrona and Ross were virtually the same age), but rather, in a Mannhei-
mian sense, that the two generations shared different “formative experiences” that 
were of crucial importance to the way they looked upon the world.2 Following Aulis 
Aarnio, a historical examination of legal theory must pay attention to both the so-
cio-economic and the theoretic-philosophical situation of the actors (Aarnio 1976, 
31). The 1930s are often presented as a watershed in Nordic political history. It was 
the decade of the famous settlements between the workers and the farmers, and the 
beginning of the half-century long Social Democratic hegemony in Nordic politics. 
On these pages it will be argued that, while the first generation of Scandinavian 
Legal Realists used their theories in order to overcome the conservative and liberal 
dominance in Swedish politics, the latter generation worked in a political milieu 
largely dictated by the ideas of planned economy and state intervention, and in 
which, following the rise of totalitarianism and the Second World War, “democra-
cy” had emerged as the central political challenge. While the first generation was 
more explicit in propagating certain political reforms, the second generation nursed 
a more instrumental view of legal science. In fact, following the political changes 
 
1  It might be justified to add a third group of an increasing number of scholars who claim 
that the relation between Scandinavian Legal Realism and (welfare state) politics should not 
be exaggerated (cf. Björne 2007, 368; Pihlajamäki 2004). 
2  According to Karl Mannheim (1927) a ”generation” is essentially tied to subjective expe-
riences and can therefore not be reduced to any objective and mechanical criteria. 
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during the 1930s, it became a pressing task for the second generation to take the 
edge off the radicalism of their predecessors. 
 To study “theoreticians as politicians” is in Kari Palonen’s terms to follow the 
Skinnerian inversion of the study of political thought, from the analysis of ideas and 
principles applied on a separate sphere of politics, to an analysis of thoughts and 
ideas as moves in the political world itself (Palonen 2003, 173-180).3 However, the 
philosophical field can be viewed as a “political” sphere in its own right, where con-
tingency and controversy reigns, and where the borders between friends and ene-
mies are well defined. The 1930s also marked a significant turning point in Nordic 
philosophy, witnessing the breakthrough of logical empiricism, and accordingly, it 
will be argued that the second generation of Scandinavian Legal Realists successfully 
adopted this novel philosophy as part of their criticism. But however critical the 
second generation was of Lundstedt and Olivecrona, they never denounced their 
intellectual debt to Hägerström, and therefore, the conflicts between the generati-
ons often took the form of a struggle for the right to represent the Hägerströmian 
legacy. 
Hägerström’s legacy 
Scandinavian Legal Realism has been defined as a group of individual legal scholars 
that had little in common except for their respect and admiration for Axel Hä-
gerström (Dalberg-Larsen 2006, 66). Undoubtedly, as the founder and leader of the 
so called Uppsala school in philosophy, Hägerström exerted an immense influence 
on his students, and some of his most devoted disciples were arguably from the field 
of law. Vilhelm Lundstedt, professor in Civil Law in Uppsala (1914-1952) and Karl 
Olivecrona, professor in Procedural Law in Lund (1933-1964) spent much of their 
careers deciphering, completing and implementing the programme of their master. 
But Hägerström’s importance did not confine itself to the universities; he represen-
ted a break with the conservative idealistic tradition of Christopher J. Boström, and 
especially his radical value theory, later labelled “value nihilism”, marked a signifi-
cant turning point in Swedish intellectual life (Källström 1984; Nordin 1983). In 
his famous inaugural lecture “Om moraliska föreställningars sanning” (1911), Hä-
gerström argued that value judgements are not real judgements as they always 
include an emotive element, a feeling, which does not aim at presenting its subject 
as existent in time and space. Therefore, a value judgement cannot be true or false, 
there is no way to prove that a given valuation is correct or not, that someone ought 
 
3  For an application and discussion of the relevance of a Skinnerian approach to the history of 
jurisprudence, see Blandhol 1999 & 2005 respectively.  
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to do something, or that something is someone’s duty (Peterson 1973; Danielson 
1990).  
 In legal theory, Hägerström aimed at uncovering metaphysical elements by 
means of conceptual analysis in order to establish a foundation for a truly scientific 
theory of law. As such, Hägerström’s programme has been seen as an attempt to 
improve the doctrines of legal positivism (Bjarup 1982; Helin 1988; Lyles 2006), 
and this was apparently also how Hägerström himself conceived his mission. He 
followed the legal positivists in claiming that it is only by focusing on a study of the 
law as a positive fact that the blatant metaphysics of natural law could be avoided. 
But Hägerström argued that legal positivism failed in giving a sufficient account of 
the validity of law. In this connection Hägerström devoted much energy to a refuta-
tion of the so called “will-theories”, according to which the law was valid by virtue 
of the commands or declarations of the will of a supreme authority, the state, the 
society or the people. According to Hägerström, the will-theories failed to present 
the physical person that was the subject of these wills, and thus the talk of “the law 
as the will of a legislator” was nothing but an anthropomorphic construction (cf. 
Hägerström 1916, 37-41). 
 A central theme for Hägerström was the analysis of basic legal concepts such as 
‘rights’ and ‘duties’, which he refuted as metaphysical pseudo-concepts representing 
nothing existent in time and space. According to Hägerström, any attempt at de-
termining the facts that correspond to the idea of ‘rights’ leads to “insuperable diffi-
culties” (Hägerström 1927, 4). By the ‘right to property’ we do not mean protection 
by the government, because, all the government can do is to help me regain the 
property if it is lost or stolen. Similarly, if a person is obliged to me, the state can in 
no way guarantee that he will carry out the payment in time. It is the right that is 
the precondition for the protection, and not the protection that is a precondition for 
the right. What we really mean by a legal ‘right’, Hägerström argued, is a supersti-
tious and magical power (Hägerström 1927, 1-6).  
Lundstedt, philosophy and social reform  
Hägerström’s value nihilism and analysis of ‘rights’ are two separate theories; Sven 
Danielsson (1990) has aptly pointed to the fact that it is possible to support one of 
the theories while disapproving of the other. However, the ways that the theories 
were used in political debates were rather similar. In the same way that the value 
nihilistic theory played an important role as an argument against conservative moral 
attitudes, the claims that there are no rights was used in order to legitimate changes 
in the legal attitudes of people, and even for modifications in the law. Hägerström 
himself undoubtedly nursed optimistic beliefs in the emancipatory significance of his 
philosophy, but some of his disciples were far more buoyant. Lundstedt, especially, 
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who served as a Social Democratic Member of Parliament in 1929-48, never hesita-
ted to make political use of the Hägerströmian tenets. From Lundstedt’s point of 
view, it made no sense to claim that expropriation of land constituted a violation of 
‘the right to property’, as this ‘right’ was created and guaranteed by the state in the 
first place. It would be more correct to say, Lundstedt argued, that the possibility of 
expropriation is part of ‘the right to property’; i.e. that the rules regarding private 
property are construed in such a way, that nothing prevents the government from 
taking control of the land if necessary (Lundstedt 1925, 89).  
 ‘Property’ was particularly topical in the debates before the 1928 elections, when 
the Social Democratic proposal for a substantial reform of the law of inheritance was 
criticised by the conservatives as a violation of the ‘right to property’. Staffan 
Källström has illustrated the manner in which Lundstedt countered such allegations 
with Hägerströmian arguments, claiming the non-existence of the right to property 
in political speeches (Källström 1991, 15). Nevertheless, even if the concept of 
‘rights’ was non-existent, metaphysical and based on an ancient idea of magical 
forces, Lundstedt still maintained, in his theoretical writings, that there are some 
“realities that correspond” to the concept of ‘rights’, namely a certain position of 
safety, which is the result of the regular enforcement of certain legal rules and the 
psychological effects this has on the minds of people. But this, Lundstedt argued, is 
clearly not what is conceived by ‘rights’ in legal theory or in public mind, and there-
fore it would be better to abandon the concept altogether (Lundstedt 1922, 73-74). 
 Besides ‘property’, Lundstedt devoted much effort to a criticism of international 
law, which he thought was the result of a “double forgery”. It was based on a mis-
leading conception of municipal law, misleadingly used on a particularly ill-suited 
topic. Lundstedt pointed to the fact that in contrast to municipal law, international 
law lacks an authoritative power that enforces the rules. Thus, while there are 
within a legal community, such as the state, certain facts that lie behind the chimera 
of ‘rights’, all that remains in international law are the rules themselves and a su-
perstitious belief in their binding force. Lundstedt repeatedly argued that it was the 
superstitious beliefs in the ‘rights’ of nations and peoples that had been the ultimate 
reason for the outbreak of the World War, and that only a radical break with this 
cerebral metaphysics could pave a way for lasting peace (Lundstedt 1924; 1925; 
1931).4 
 While the Hägerströmian philosophy constituted a powerful critical weapon, it 
was perhaps less simple to give it a constructive positive role. Lundstedt’s attempt 
 
4  In the late 1930s he returned to the issue, claiming that the political development in Europe 
had proved him right (Lundstedt 1937). And after the war, or at the beginning of the Cold 
War, Lundstedt was one of the few Social Democrats who supported Swedish membership 
of NATO. Lundstedt preferred a strong union of western democracies to another helpless 
attempt at a League of Nations (Lundtstedt 1948).  
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was based on the notion of “public welfare” (samhällsnyttan),5 which he launched as 
a realistic alternative to the different metaphysical dogmas concerning the basis of 
law. According to Lundstedt, the purpose of punishment is not for revenge, but to 
maintain a system that is to the benefit of all, i.e. a system where a thief is held 
liable for his damages. If the purpose of the law was ‘justice’, it could be argued that 
theft should be condoned if the thief is considerably worse off than the subject of the 
crime (Lundstedt 1925, 23-26). Lundstedt also used his principle of public welfare 
as an argument against a prohibition law, as he believed it would harm the public 
respect for law (Lundstedt 1922a). In 1933 he argued in favour of the decriminalisa-
tion of homosexuality, as he believed the reigning law had too many unwanted con-
sequences both for the homosexuals and the general public (Lundstedt 1933).  
 However, the principle of ‘public welfare’ was problematic and often criticised. 
Lundstedt repeatedly emphasised that it was not “a moral or a philosophical prin-
ciple” (Lundstedt 1925, 145). Contrary to utilitarianism, Lundstedt acknowledged 
the Hägerströmian thesis that there are no objectively valid moral principles. 
Rather, “public welfare” should be understood in a descriptive sense, representing 
the actual valuations of people in society. According to Lundstedt, it was simply the 
principle of furthering things “which indisputably man actually strives to attain” 
(Lundstedt 1925, 146). But Lundstedt’s arguments were not altogether convincing; 
he failed to prove that people in general actually supported the values he was propo-
sing, and he did not provide a measure for those situations in which the valuations 
of people, in fact, diverged. Moreover, the fact that Lundstedt eagerly made norma-
tive use of his principle also seemed to violate his Hägerströmian premises 
(Zambroni 2006). In general, Lundstedt was somewhat hesitant on whether “public 
welfare” was a principle that, as a matter of fact, influenced the legislation, or 
whether it was a normative principle that Lundstedt thought should influence le-
gislation. As Markku Helin has pointed out, there was a trait of historicism in 
Lundstedt’s theory (Helin 1988, 125). His ambition was, so to speak, to assist an 
inevitable development towards enlightenment and realism. 
Olivecrona, law and force 
Olivecrona’s Law as fact (1939) has been characterised as a milestone in the deve-
lopment of Scandinavian Legal Realism (Björne 2007, 321). The book was not only 
a concise and lucid exposition of the Hägerström-Lundstedtian philosophy, but it 
also included a more thorough and convincing attempt at a positive reconstruction 
 
5  ‘Public welfare’ was the English translation for ‘samhällsnytta’ that Lundstedt used himself. 
Cf. Lundstedt 1925.  
68 RETFÆRD ÅRGANG 32 2009 NR. 1/124 
Johan Strang 
of legal science. Olivecrona followed Hägerström’s analysis in claiming that the 
binding force of law exists only as a psychological effect of the consistent implemen-
tation of legal rules, and that a legal ‘right’ is an idea of a fictitious power (Oli-
vecrona 1939, 15-17 & 88-89). But as the result of these considerations, Olivecrona 
concluded that the law itself is essentially organised force. According to Olivecrona, 
organised force is the backbone of every conceivable modern community, without 
which “there could be no real security, not even with regard to life and limb”. The 
modern state, in turn, is an organisation that has monopolised the use of force (Oli-
vecrona 1939, 123-136).  
 The idea of a relation between the state and force echoes Max Weber, but as 
Svante Nordin has suggested, the idolising manner in which Olivecrona portrayed 
the necessity of force also resembled the famous German legal theoretician Carl 
Schmitt (Nordin 1983, 124). There is certainly an element of Schmittean decisio-
nism in the theories of the Scandinavian Legal Realists – the law is valid only becau-
se it is affirmed and protected by an authority.6 However, Nordin seems to base his 
claim mainly on the political role that Olivecrona took during the Second World 
War. There was a notable addition of four pages at the end of the Swedish and 
German translations of Law as fact in which Olivecrona developed Lundstedt’s ar-
guments against ‘international law’ into a call for a monopolisation of the use of 
force in Europe. According to Olivecrona, the prevailing anarchism on the European 
continent, which manifested itself in one destructive war following upon the other, 
could only be overcome if the nations submitted themselves to an organisation 
controlled by the strongest power in Europe (Olivecrona 1940b, 226-9; 1940c, 
195-8). The political implications of these paragraphs were simple enough for anyo-
ne to decipher, and soon Olivecrona announced his German sympathies by the no-
torious pamphlet England eller Tyskland (1940a). In his study on Lund’s University 
during the Second World War, Sverker Oredsson (1996, 96) claims that Olivecrona 
rapidly established himself as a leading proponent for Nazi Germany in Sweden, as 
he was one of the very few who did it with something resembling a coherent intel-
lectual argumentation.  
 Even if it would be a mistake to straightforwardly label Olivecrona a National 
Socialist or a fascist,7 it is safe to say that he utilised the legal philosophy of Hä-
gerström in a different direction than the Social Democrat Lundstedt. On the other 
hand, there were some striking similarities in the ways Lundstedt and Olivecrona 
conceived of the relation between legal science and politics. They were both on a 
mission to overturn the conservatism of both Boströmian philosophy and legal posi-
 
6  Schmitt referred positively to Lundstedt’s criticism of international law in his Die Kernfrage 
des Völkerbundes (1926, 45). 
7  In the terminology of Oredsson, Olivecrona was “Nazi-minded”, by which Oredsson means 
“a person hoping for Nazi-German victory in the war” (Oredsson 1996, 9-10, 144, 219). 
RETFÆRD ÅRGANG 32 2009 NR. 1/124 69 
 Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag 
tivism in favour of a legal science that functioned as a vehicle for social reform. 
Their ambition was to provide the legal foundations for a new society order. More-
over, both of them ascribed a central role to the legal scientist in the elaboration and 
construction of this new social order. It is perhaps no surprise that Olivecrona’s 
vision of a society in which the law was maintained through the monopolisation of 
organised force ignored a discussion on the democratic control of legislation. But 
neither did Lundstedt’s concept of “public welfare” emphasise such considerations 
(Björne 2007, 368); instead he simply seemed to presume that ‘public welfare’ was a 
self-evident principle, which arguably left the reader wondering if Lundstedt was 
not merely promoting his own political valuations. At the very least, it seems as if 
his theory, which was framed as a criticism of dogmatically conservative or liberal 
legal theories, yields a similar dogmatism in the name of ‘public welfare’.  
Hedenius and the new theory of meaning 
For the democratically minded followers of Hägerström, Olivecrona’s pamphlet 
England eller Tyskland (1940a) could hardly have come at a worse time. The discus-
sion on the demoralising and destructive consequences of Hägerström’s value nihi-
lism, which had already begun in the early 1930s, had recently reached its peak as a 
result of the outbreak of the Second World War and the posthumous publication of 
a collection of some moral and social philosophical essays by Hägerström, as Socialfi-
losofiska uppsatser (1939). In a number of critical reviews it had been suggested that 
Hägerström’s theory was leading to moral nihilism and cultural decline. Some even 
argued that Hägerström’s philosophy was connected with the rise of totalitarianism 
on the European continent (Källström 1986, 110-116). This was the immediate 
background for the critical review of Olivecrona’s book, by the young Uppsala phi-
losopher Ingemar Hedenius, in the Social Democratic journal Tiden in 1940. Even if 
Hedenius, on the face of it, hardly discussed the closing paragraphs of Olivecrona’s 
book, his concern to find a way of refuting Olivecrona was undoubtedly largely 
motivated by the political ballast that Olivecrona had imposed on Uppsala philo-
sophy (Oredsson 1996, 98).  
 Hedenius’ main argument was that Olivecrona seemed to have somewhat 
contradictory ambitions with his book. On the same pages that he was emphatically 
declaring that notions such as ‘the binding force of law’, ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ were 
meaningless and metaphysical, he was also describing what he called “the realities 
that are covered” by these concepts. “There must be something erroneous at play 
here”, Hedenius argued, because surely, the meaning of a concept cannot be 
anything else than the facts that are covered by it (Hedenius 1940, 431). This 
might seem a trivial comment, but it was based on the fact that Hedenius was 
abandoning the act-psychological theory of meaning, used by Hägerström, in fa-
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vour of something resembling the verification or testability theory of meaning, ad-
vocated by many representatives of logical empiricism. 
 The turning point was more explicit in the book Om rätt och moral (1941), in 
which Hedenius stated that the problem of “theoretical meaning” was emerging as 
a key challenge in contemporary philosophy and that he himself subscribed to the 
view that “[t]he meaning of a statement is the fact which makes it true or false” 
(Hedenius 1941, 62). The meaning of “it is raining”, Hedenius argued, is the fact 
that drops of water are falling from the sky. A completely different thing is the 
thoughts or ideas someone has in mind while saying, “it is raining”, and yet another 
thing is the theories people have regarding the meaning of the statement. Echoing 
G. E. Moore’s “A Defence of Common Sense” (1925), Hedenius claimed that it is 
perfectly possible to use a sentence correctly without knowing its correct analysis. 
The fact that the Ancient Greeks had an erroneous theory on the correct analysis of 
“it is raining”, e.g. that Zeus was throwing water from the sky, did not prevent 
them from using the sentence correctly. Similarly, Hedenius continued, legal terms 
can be used correctly despite the misleading ideas there are about their meaning. 
The things people have in mind, or the theories they have regarding, for example, 
‘rights’ have no bearing, whatsoever, on the philosophical analysis of the meaning of 
the word (Hedenius 1941, 62-68). 
 This was a direct attack on the first generation of Scandinavian Legal Realists. 
According to Hedenius, it was in failing to recognise this point that Hägerström, 
Lundstedt and Olivecrona forced their opponents into one of two wicked positions. 
If you identified the meaning of a juridical term, e.g. ‘right’, with some idea of vali-
dity or a binding force of law, you were (correctly, in Hedenius’ view) refuted as 
metaphysical. But, on the other hand, if you tried to describe the facts that are cove-
red by a legal concept, Lundstedt and Olivecrona claimed that you failed to reach 
“the true meaning” of the concept. In other words, Lundstedt and Olivecrona had 
“construed a scissor that enabled them to cut the head of any legal philosopher” 
(Hedenius 1941, 74).  
 Lundstedt and Olivecrona were thoroughly enraged by Hedenius’ book. Oli-
vecrona published a pamphlet including an appendix called “Settlement with docent 
I. Hedenius” (1942), and Lundstedt interrupted his course at the faculty of law in 
Uppsala in order to devote the remaining semester to confront “the ignorant attack” 
by Hedenius upon the achievements of the late Hägerström (Lundstedt 1942, 14). 
Lundstedt accused Hedenius of exploiting some terminological difficulties that were 
inevitable due to the revolutionary character of the theory. Lundstedt emphasised 
that when he used ‘rights’ it was merely as a word, label or term, that had nothing 
whatsoever in common with the ideas of traditional legal science (Lundstedt 1942, 
29-30). Olivecrona, on the other hand, argued that that Hedenius misleadingly 
thought that a criticism of central legal concepts implied a denial of the realities 
that the concepts are supposed to stand for (Olivecrona 1942, 51). These arguments 
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hardly hit the mark; Hedenius’ main point had not been to claim that Lundstedt 
and Olivecrona unwarrantedly used the concept ‘rights’ or that they denied the 
existence of some realities, but that they wrongly associated the meaning of ‘rights’ 
with a metaphysical theory of their nature and not with the realities that they, with 
great success, were describing.8  
 The explicit references to logical empiricism and the Cambridge School were 
rather scarce in Hedenius’ book, and both Lundstedt and Olivecrona continued to 
confront Hedenius with traditional Uppsala philosophic arguments, thus failing to 
grasp the novel philosophical basis of Hedenius (Nordin 1983, 153). The thing that 
arguably disturbed Lundstedt and Olivecrona the most was the fact that Hedenius, 
by defending the value nihilistic theory in this very popular and successful book, 
seemed to be on the verge of colonising the Hägerströmian legacy. Hedenius was 
rapidly emerging as the main proponent of value nihilism in Sweden, i.e. as the new 
and improved Hägerström. Few noticed that Hedenius had transformed value nihi-
lism from a theory on the ontological and epistemological status of moral ideas, into 
a semantic theory on the correct analysis of certain linguistic expressions (Nordin 
1983, 149-152). In fact, Hedenius’ value nihilism was far more similar to the theo-
ries presented by leading logical empiricists such as Ayer (1936) or Carnap (1937) 
than it was to Hägerström. One could argue that Hedenius introduced logical em-
piricism to Sweden, and to Nordic legal theory, by anchoring it to the Hägerströ-
mian tradition (Strang 2006, 262).  
Hedenius and the defence of jurisprudence 
Hedenius also proposed “an important modification” of value nihilism, the distinc-
tion between ‘genuine’ and ‘non-genuine’ legal statements (äkta och oäkta rättssatser). 
While Lundstedt and Olivecrona were correct in claiming that some moral or legal 
statements, the so called ‘genuine legal statements’, are theoretically meaningless, 
i.e. clearly only used in order to persuade or to announce a personal emotive point of 
view, Hedenius believed that they had failed to notice that a moral or legal state-
ment also can be used in such a way, as a ‘non-genuine legal statement’, that it is 
 
8  However, Lundstedt and Olivecrona did have a point in claiming that Hedenius mislea-
dingly presented their theories as a reaction against some dated natural law philosophy or 
against the conceptions of common people, and not as a reaction upon ideas in contempora-
ry legal positivistic theories (Lundstedt 1942, 134-5). On the other hand, they often seemed 
to slide over from a discussion of the latter to a discussion of the former, presuming that the 
conceptions of the legal scientists determined the way common people thought about 
things. At least, this must have been a tacit premise in Lundstedt’s argument on the dangers 
of international law. 
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clearly true or false. For example, “It is not right to listen to English radio in Nazi-
Germany” is a true or false statement, corresponding to the fact, whether or not 
listening to English radio actually is prohibited in Germany (Hedenius 1941, 56-
59). The origin of Hedenius’ distinction has been subject to some discussion. Some 
regard it as a stroke of genius (von Wright 1999, 32); others claim, as a result of 
historical exegesis, that Hägerström himself was familiar with the idea of non-
genuine legal statements (Peterson 1973, 74f.). There are, however, good reasons to 
suspect that the source of the distinction is to be found in the article “Imperativer 
og Logik” by the Danish logical empiricist Jørgen Jørgensen. In this article, that 
started a comprehensive debate on the possibility of “practical inferences”,9 Jørgen-
sen remarked that an imperative such as “You ought to close the door!” can be used 
as “a description of the fact that a demand or command exists” in case of which it is 
clearly capable of being true or false (Jørgensen 1938, 185). This certainly mirrors 
the idea behind ‘non-genuine’ legal statements, and Hedenius was undoubtedly 
familiar with the article as he discussed the problem of “practical inferences” rather 
extensively in Om rätt och moral (Hedenius 1941, 106-115).10  
 Lundstedt found the distinction between ‘genuine’ and ‘non-genuine’ legal sta-
tements trivial (Lundstedt 1942, 43), and of course, in some sense it was. But it had 
significant implications; the example of the prohibition of English radio in Germany 
alluded to the political sympathies of Olivecrona, but was also purposely chosen in 
order to refute arguments, raised by many critics, that the Uppsala philosophers 
were forced to hold that the Nazi-German laws were ‘right’ (rätt). By emphasising 
the demarcation between law and morals, Hedenius tried to make the point that 
even if one used ‘law’ and ‘right’ descriptively about the Nazi-German system, one 
could still be convinced that it was repulsive in a moral or political sense. By stating 
that “it is not right to listen to English radio in Germany”, one does not necessarily 
indicate, in a moral sense, that Germans ought to refrain from listening to foreign 
radio stations (Hedenius 1941, 57). Moreover, Hedenius also used the distinction 
between genuine and non-genuine legal statements as a criticism of the radicalism 
of the Hägerströmian theory. There was no doubt that Hedenius believed that the 
theories of Hägerström and Lundstedt had been useful as weapons against conserva-
tism, but the repeated claims that “there are no rights” and of the “unscientific na-
ture of legal science” had prompted negative reactions, not only from the legal 
community, who sensed that their discipline was under attack, but also from the 
general public. At a point in time when the political and legal sovereignty of the 
 
9  The problem, later called ”Jørgensen’s dilemma”, was to account for the apparent logical 
nature of an inference such as “keep your promises, this is a promise, therefore keep this 
promise” despite the ”well-established facts” that imperatives cannot be true or false, while 
only sentences that are capable of being true or false can function in logical inferences.  
10  Elsewhere, Hedenius (1939, 326) explicitly refers to Jørgensen’s article.  
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Nordic countries was in increasing danger, any suggestion of the relativity of law 
was bound to be criticised. With Hedenius, the most radical and aggravating parts 
of the theory could be discarded without abandoning the basic line of thought: that 
law is essentially man-made and thus revisable in any way we like. When Hedenius 
in 1979 was awarded an honorary doctorate in law in Uppsala, he was celebrated as 
the man who had saved Swedish jurisprudence (Nordin 2004, 115). It was undoub-
tedly an overstatement, but Hedenius certainly provided jurisprudence and Nordic 
law a more stable ground at a point in time when it was challenged, not only by the 
radicalism of his predecessors, but also by anti-democratic political movements and 
foreign armed forces.  
Ross and the instrumental legal science 
Besides Hedenius, the Dane Alf Ross must be considered as the main agent in the 
transformation of Scandinavian Legal Realism, but Ross had arguably been more 
involved with the first generation than Hedenius. When he failed to get his Kelse-
nian Theorie der Rechtsquellen (1929) accepted as a doctoral thesis at the University of 
Copenhagen, Ross contacted Hägerström, who accepted it as a dissertation in philo-
sophy in Uppsala. Ross studied for Hägerström in 1929-30, which resulted in two 
large monographs on the basic problems in moral philosophy and law (Ross 1933a 
& 1934). The latter treatise eventually granted him his longed for doctorate in ju-
risprudence at his home university in Copenhagen.  
 For Ross, Hägerström represented a more scientific way of looking upon law, 
enabling him to overcome and criticise both Kelsen and the professors that had 
turned him down at the University of Copenhagen, i.e. Vinding Kruse (1880-1963) 
and Viggo Bentzon (1861-1937). But Ross was not an uncritical disciple of Uppsala 
philosophy. Already in 1932, he launched a frontal attack on his Hägerströmian 
brother-in-arms Lundstedt, particularly criticising the notion of ‘public welfare’ 
which he deemed no less dogmatic than any other normative moral principle (Ross 
1932, 342). According to Ross, Lundstedt’s attempts at presenting ‘public welfare’ 
as a purely descriptive principle failed, revealing only the absurdities of the notion. 
Did Lundstedt actually believe that the communists or the Nazis would make laws 
in support of ‘public welfare’ if they were to gain power in Germany, Ross asked 
rhetorically (Ross 1932, 339). Lundstedt replied by claiming that even they would 
have to present their politics in the veil of ‘public welfare’ in order to maintain po-
wer (Lundstedt 1932, 544). But as Källström notes, Lundstedt arguably failed to 
respond to the most important point in Ross’ criticism; that it is impossible to sum 
up the conflicting valuations and interests in a society in a single and definite notion 
of ‘public welfare’ without relying on metaphysical assumptions of society as a orga-
nic whole, or on an illusionary idea of harmony (Källström 1991, 51-58). Even if 
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the idea of ‘public welfare’ was not explicitly normative, it was a form of ethics that 
concealed the norm as an objective and rational principle (Ross 1933b, 118).  
 Blandhol has convincingly argued that the debate between Lundstedt and Ross 
was ultimately based on different conceptions of the relation between legal science 
and politics (Blandhol 1999, 91 & 105). While Lundstedt presented his notion of 
‘public welfare’ as a rational argument in favour of a particular political decision or 
programme, Ross emphasised that political action necessarily involves a choice that 
has to be taken on the basis of subjective interests and valuations. Instead of presen-
ting a new scientific principle, Ross stressed the rift between science and politics, is 
and ought, which resulted in an instrumental account of legal science. This was 
most explicitly developed in the final chapters of Om ret og retfærdighed where Ross 
claimed that the task of a legal scientist is to function as a “rational technician”, 
assisting the political decision makers by elaborating on the most appropriate means 
by which a given end can be realised (Ross 1953, 472). But the ideas also marked 
the strictly formal or procedural account of democracy that Ross defended in his 
Hvorfor Demokrati? For Ross, democracy indicated “a how, not a what” (Ross 1946, 
91). It was a form of governance, a political method, and not a particular political 
norm that could be established as a scientific principle. Gregory Alexander has re-
marked that the Scandinavian Legal Realists “sought to create more room for poli-
tics by making jurisprudence more scientific” (Alexander 2002, 132).11 This is un-
doubtedly true, but while Lundstedt was making room for a particular political 
content, Ross was more concerned with political form and procedure. Ross was, 
precisely as Lundstedt was, arguing that jurisprudence should be a form of social 
engineering, i.e. function as a working vehicle for social reform. But while Lund-
stedt was promoting particular political reforms on the basis of his principle of pub-
lic welfare, Ross’ conception of social engineering was instrumental and served the 
aims of the (democratically elected) political authorities. 
Ross and logical empiricism  
Ross’ acquaintance with logical empiricism can be dated back to at least the spring 
of 1934, when Otto Neurath, the locomotive of the Unity of Science movement, 
gave a guest lecture in Copenhagen. Ross contacted Neurath and a concrete result 
of their correspondence was a rather positive review by Neurath of Kritik der soge-
nannten praktischen Erkenntnis in the logical empiricist journal Erkenntnis (1935).12 
 
11  According to Alexander, this distinguished them from the American Legal Realists, who 
more explicitly emphasised the political charcter of legal science itself.  
12  This is evident from the correspondence between Ross and Neurath in 1934, available at the 
Royal Library of Copenhagen. 
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Later, Ross attended the Second (Copenhagen 1936) and Fourth (Cambridge 1938) 
International Congresses for Unity of Science, and during the Second World War he 
participated in the discussions in the Swedish philosophical journal Theoria as well as 
in the leading forum for the logical empiricists in the United States, Philosophy of 
Science.13  
 However, it was arguably the article “On the Logical Nature of Propositions of 
Value” (1945) that marked the turning point in Ross’ philosophical view. Where he 
had previously followed Hägerström in arguing that a value judgement includes a 
feeling that does not aim at presenting its object in time and space, he now based 
his arguments on principle of verification as a criterion of logical meaning in a way 
that was more akin to Hedenius’ Om rätt och moral and other logical empiricist for-
mulations. Ross was not unaware of the difference. He explicitly stated that he had 
“previously in the main accepted” the Hägerströmian theory, but that he now found 
it psychologistic (Ross 1945, 187-9). Later, in 1950, Ross stated that while Hä-
gerström believed that metaphysical statements are meaningless as they fail to de-
note anything in time and space, logical empiricism (i.e. the Finnish philosopher 
Eino Kaila) argues that metaphysical statements are meaningless as they cannot be 
tested (Ross 1950, 217). However, Ross did not denounce his affiliation to Hä-
gerström. On the contrary, he was eager to present Uppsala philosophy as a parallel 
movement to logical empiricism, and he even claimed that the logical empiricists 
(and Wittgenstein) could not compete with Hägerström “in profundity or formula-
tion” (Ross 1945, 174).  
 It has often been suggested than one should distinguish between the young Ross, 
influenced by the ideas of first Kelsen and then Hägerström, and the mature Ross 
that adopted the philosophy of logical empiricism (Blandhol 1999). But as Helin 
emphasises, the move from Uppsala philosophy to logical empiricism hardly meant 
a revolution for Ross (Helin 1988, 140). In many respects it was little more than a 
shift in perspective and way of argumentation, and often it seemed as if logical em-
piricism merely provided him with a new way of making many of the same critical 
points that he had been making since the early 1930s. For example, Ross certainly 
nursed a different view on the relation between philosophy and the special sciences 
than the Hägerströmians, even before encountering logical empiricism. Already in 
1932 he complained that Lundstedt’s war on legal science had resulted in an unfor-
tunate scepticism among legal scientists towards the new philosophical ideas. Simi-
larly in Virkelighed og Gyldighed Ross complained that Lundstedt’s persistent claims 
that “there are no rights” were excessive, serving only the rather unfortunate purpo-
 
13  In “On the Illusion of Consciousness” (1941b) Ross tried to show that the problem of the 
relation between the psychical and physical world was a “metaphysical pseudo-problem”, 
and in “Imperatives and Logic” (1941a; 1944), Ross denied the possibility of practical infe-
rences. 
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se of widening the gap between philosophy and the special sciences (Ross 1934, 19). 
While one of the main aims of Hägerström and Lundstedt had been to use philo-
sophical analysis in order to correct the special sciences, Ross shared the logical em-
piricist ambition of putting philosophy on a par with the special sciences, as part of 
the Unity of Science programme.14 Ross was also early in refuting the conceptual 
realism that marked the ideas of the first generation, and in this sense his argumen-
tation anticipated elements in Hedenius’ attack from 1941. In 1934 Ross argued 
that Lundstedt based his claims on a naïve distinction between the word and the 
concept of “rights”. Only thus, Ross claimed, was Lundstedt able to claim that the 
concept of “rights” was metaphysical, referring to some magical forces in the Hä-
gerströmian sense, while the word “rights” could still be used as “a mere designation 
for the realities that correspond to the concept”. Ross, on the other hand, did not 
believe that “a name was part of the essence or inner being of a thing” (Ross 1934, 
227-229).  
 Even if Ross’ acquaintance with logical empiricism can be traced back to the mid-
1930s it would take a while until Ross made explicit use of the new ideas in his legal 
theory. But when Ross, in his famous article “Tû-tû” (1951), returned to the 
controversy with Lundstedt, he did it from within a discussion that was performed 
wholly on “logical empiricist” or “analytical” premises. In 1945, the Swedish legal 
theoretician Per-Olof Ekelöf noticed that the method of substituting an imperative 
with a corresponding indicative sentence, proposed by Jørgensen (1938) in the 
discussion on the possibility of practical inferences, might work in accounting for 
the meaning of ‘rights’ in juridical inferences. This resulted in a debate on whether 
‘rights’ was replaceable with certain legal facts, or certain legal consequences. Ross’ 
contribution was to claim that ‘rights’ served merely as a “tool for the technique of 
presentation”, used in order to express the relation between a complex set of legal 
facts and a complex set of legal consequences, but without a “semantic reference” of 
its own. That is, though formulating it otherwise, Ross essentially followed Lund-
stedt in claiming that ‘rights’ was a meaningless notion that did not denote 
anything in time and space; he even accepted that it was “superstitious to maintain 
that something mystical and indeterminable comes into being” between a legal fact 
and a legal consequence. But when Lundstedt charged anyone who continued to use 
the word ‘rights’ as “a sinful heathen” Ross denounced him as a “Swedish missiona-
 
14  It is possible that the correspondence with Neurath in the spring of 1934 inspired Ross to 
talk about “Forskningens Enhedsbygning” [“the unification of research”] in the preface of 
Virkelighed og Gyldighed, which was dated 1934.  
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ry” (Ross 1951, 267). According to Ross, ‘rights’ had a perfectly legitimate function 
in legal language, despite the fact that it lacked a “semantic reference”.15  
 In his next major work, Om Ret og Retfærdighed – en inførelse i den analytiske retsfilo-
sofi (1953), logical empiricism formed a central part of Ross’ theory, not only 
through programmatic declarations that he was subscribing to “the views of modern 
scientifically oriented philosophy”, according to which philosophy does not have a 
subject of study distinct from the special sciences; that philosophy is not a theory, 
but a method of logical analysis,16 but also by his use of the principle of verification 
(or testability) as a main argument in favour of his idea that “valid law” is a progno-
sis of future judge-behaviour (Ross 1953, 34 & 53). However, by using the rather 
fresh and untainted label “analytic” in the subtitle, Ross was able to allude to both 
Hägerström and logical empiricism, thus presenting them as parts of the same mo-
vement.  
Two generations; so what? 
There are good reasons to distinguish between the two factions, or generations, of 
Scandinavian Legal Realists. While the first generation was rebelling against the 
conservatism of Boströmian idealism and aiming at little less than a social upheaval 
on the basis of their legal theory, one of the main ambitions of the second generati-
on was to take the edge off the radicalism of their predecessors. Hedenius and Ross, 
were working in a context in which economic planning and social reform were parts 
of the mainstream political agenda, but in which democracy had emerged as a main 
topic of the political discourse. Accordingly, they thought that legal science had to 
be merely instrumental, serving the aims of the (democratically elected) political 
authorities.17 In their criticism of the first generation, they were able to make use of 
new philosophical trends, imported from abroad. It is difficult to say to what extent 
the philosophy of logical empiricism influenced their political agenda, but their 
politically motivated urge to overcome the radicalism of the first generation certain-
ly facilitated the introduction of the new philosophy, as it provided them with a 
powerful theoretical weapon.  
 
15  It has been suggested that Ross’ idea of ‘rights’ as a “tool for the technique of presentation” 
mirrors Carnap’s thoughts on “theoretical concepts” (Sartor 2007), but there is no evidence 
of influence on this point.  
16  “[Filosofien] er overhovedet ingen teori, men en metode. Denne metode er den logiske 
analyse. Filosofi er videnskabslogik, dess genstand er det videnskablige sprog” (Ross 1953, 
34). 
17  However, this very idea was also criticised for being toothless in the face of undemocratic 
regimes. Cf. Strang 2009.  
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 The distinction between the two generations serves as a useful specification in the 
recurring debate on the political implications of the school. When Bjarup and 
Sundberg criticise the absolutistic elements of Scandinavian Legal Realism, they are 
primarily referring to Hägerström, Lundstedt and Olivecrona. And when Alexan-
der, Blandhol and others speak about democratisation, social engineering, and the 
welfare state, they refer to Ross and Hedenius.  
 But the distinction also helps us understand the rather late international recepti-
on of Scandinavian Legal Realism. The scepticism, if not hostility, of Finnish legal 
theorists towards Scandinavian Legal Realism in the 1930s has often been explained 
with reference to the legalistic heritage from the 19th century, when Finland was an 
autonomous Grand Duchy of the Russian empire; the German orientation of the 
Finnish academic elite; the agitated language question that made everything Swe-
dish unpopular; and with the leftish aura of Hägerström and Lundstedt, thoroughly 
suspicious in a white Finland recovering from a bloody civil war (Helin 1988; Mal-
minen 2007; Pihlajamäki 1997). After the Second World War much of this chan-
ged: the German influence on the Finnish academia was declining; the Nordic 
countries were emerging as a lifeline to the Western hemisphere; and the ideas of 
planned economy and social engineering were gaining influence in Finnish politics. 
On the basis of this article, however, it must be emphasised that also Scandinavian 
Legal Realism itself had undergone a significant transformation during the same 
period, both politically and philosophically. The alleged “socialism” of Hägerström 
and Lundstedt had been replaced by a form of Scandinavian Legal Realism that was 
explicitly critical of communism and endorsed an instrumental understanding of the 
relation between science and politics. Moreover, the Uppsala philosophy of Hä-
gerström, which remained virtually unknown outside of Sweden, had been replaced 
with logical empiricism, a philosophy that was represented in Finland since the early 
1930s by Eino Kaila, and later also by Georg Henrik von Wright. The so called 
“analytical jurisprudence” that reigned in Finland during the post-war era was 
largely built, by e.g. Simo Zitting and Osvi Lahtinen, on the basis of Alf Ross on the 
one hand, and on the domestic philosophical tradition that followed in the wake of 
logical empiricism on the other (Aarnio 1976, 48-53).  
 Logical empiricism was one of the main international philosophical trends of the 
20th century, and therefore it is hardly very surprising that it was the second genera-
tion (mainly Alf Ross) that forged an international name for the movement.18 The 
radicalism of Hägerström, Lundstedt and Olivecrona had been a recipe for isolation, 
and when Scandinavian Legal Realism in the 1940s was confronted and, to a certain 
 
18  The term “Scandinavian Legal Realism” itself does not seem to have been launched until the 
1950s. At least, this is indicated by a search on the terms ”Scandinavian Realism” or ”Scan-
dinavian Legal Realism” in the digital archives of Jstor. (www.jstor.org, accessed on Februa-
ry 13, 2009).  
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extent, merged with other theoretical points of view, it lost not only some of its 
radicalism, but also some of its uniqueness. From this perspective, Rune Slagstad is 
undoubtedly correct in describing the Norwegian Legal Realism of the post-war era 
(Thorstein Eckhoff and Vilhelm Aubert) as a “less militant” version of Scandinavian 
Legal Realism, gathering themes from the Uppsala School, logical empiricism, 
American Legal Realism and the Norwegian realistic tradition since Anton Martin 
Schweigaard (1808-1870) (Slagstad 1991, 217-219). However, as the same could 
be said of the whole of the second generation of Scandinavian Legal Realists, his 
characterisation hardly captures anything uniquely Norwegian.19  
 The difference between the two generations of Scandinavian Legal Realists is 
substantial and it is certainly debatable whether the second generation belonged to, 
or rather marked the death of Scandinavian Legal Realism. According to Stig Jør-
gensen it is “for several reasons inaccurate to include Ross among the representatives 
of Scandinavian Realism”, while Dalberg-Larsen goes as far as to claim that the 
association with Scandinavian Legal Realism hampered the reception of Ross’ ideas 
from the 1940s onwards (Jørgensen 1986, 289; Dalberg-Larsen 2006, 66). Lars 
Björne argues that the 1940s were characterised by a “syncretism of methods”, cha-
racterised above all by the consolidation of Scandinavian Legal Realism with the old 
Nordic realistic tradition of Schweigaard and Anders Sandøe Ørsted (1778-1860) 
(Björne 2007, 370-71). Of course, to a certain extent it is a matter of convention (or 
taste) to pick a label for the positions of Hedenius and Ross; and arguably, the point 
about the different political and philosophical conditions and agendas of the two 
generations is valuable however one opts to label them. From an historical point of 
view, however it is rather plain that both Hedenius and Ross were greatly concerned 
to present themselves as representatives of the movement originating in the philo-
sophy of Hägerström. They did not present the transformation from Uppsala philo-
sophy to logical empiricism as a revolutionary break, but as a development within 
the movement. The debate between Hedenius-Ross and Lundstedt-Olivecrona can 
be seen as an example of “the politics of philosophy”, i.e. as a struggle for the right 
to represent the Hägerströmian tradition.20 
 
19  And Slagstad is definitely on the wrong track when describing the Norwegians as less sedu-
ced by logical empiricism than the Uppsala School; it was actually the pupils of the Norwe-
gian logical empiricist Arne Næss, who made the most programmatic attempts to introduce 
logical empiricism (and particularly the ideas of Rudolf Carnap) to the field of legal science 
(cf. Aubert 1943). 
20  I wish to thank Sverre Blandhol, as well as the EINO and Bjørnson seminars for valuable 
comments on earlier versions of the manuscript.  
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